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13.1 Introduction
The positive correlation between the price level and the interest rate-
"Gibson'sparadox"-isoneofthebest known and leastunderstood ofall
economic regularities. Keynes called it "one of the most completely
established empirical facts in the whole field ofquantitative economics"
(Keynes 1930, 2: p.198). Irving Fisher asserted that "no problem in
economics has been more hotly debated" (Fisher 1930, p. 399). Even a
casual glance at the literature (see, for example, Shiller and Siegel 1977,
and the sources cited therein) suggests that Fisher's assertion is as true
today as it was fifty years ago. And Keynes's contention seems amply
supported by figure 13.1, which plots the yield on long-term bonds
(consols) and the log ofthe price level in Britain from 1729 to 1931 (the
gold standard years for which both series are available).1 The striking
visual impression of a positive relationship between the price level and
interest rates is confirmed by the following regression, which estimates
the yield on consols (R) as a function of the log of the price level (with
t-statistics in parentheses):
R t = -5.60 + 2.04 log Pt.
(- 8.83) (14.5)
R
2 = .51, D.W. = .31.
As beguiling as figure 13.1 and equation (1) are, both suffer from two
serious defects. First, it is well known that many economic time series
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Fig. 13.1 Yield on consols and the U.K. price level, 1729-1931.
exhibit nonstationarity, i.e., the series fail to revert to their means. As
Granger and Newbold (1974) have shown, if one regresses one nonsta-
tionary series on another, the chances are high that one will observe a
statisticallysignificantrelationship, eventhoughbothseriesare randomly
generated and in fact unrelated to one another. We show that this
problem is indeed presentin the datafor the price level and interest rates
and that once the series are made stationary the apparent relationship
largely disappears.
The second defect of figure 13.1 and equation (1) is that prices and
interest rates are both endogenous variables. The observed relationship
between them might well reflect the effects ofsome commonforce that is
acting on both. Figure 13.2 suggests what that force might be. Again the
log of the price level and the consol rate are plotted for 1729-1931. We
have added to the figure a measure ofreal defense expenditures, labeled
WAR. The apparent association between WAR and either prices or
interest rates is, to our eyes, at least as impressive as the apparent
existence of Gibson's paradox. This apparent association is no accident:
large increases in defense expenditures (principally during wars) create
incentives to issue fiat money, which in turn tends to generate inflation
and high price levels. Wars also create a scarcity of goods currently
available for nonwar uses relative to the amounts thatwill be available in
the (postwar) future.
2 The ensuing attempts by individuals to smooth
their consumption over time create an excess demand for current goods
and thus a rise in the interest rate. Oncethe nonstationarityofprices and
interest rates and the effects ofwars are accountedfor, Gibson's paradox
disappears.589 War, Prices, and Interest Rates
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Fig. 13.2 Yield on consols, the U.K. price level, and real defense ex-
penditures, 1729-1931.
13.2 Prices and Interest Rates
Many explanations ofGibson's paradox have been proposed; perhaps
the best known is the so-called Fisher effect. As first propounded by
Irving Fisher (1930), this theory asserts that borrowers and lenders
attempt to forecast the inflation rate that will prevail during the life of
their debt contracts. Positive inflation rates imply reductions in the real
value of debt obligations; hence lenders will demand and borrowers will
accede to high nominal interest rates to offset that result. Negative
inflation ratessimilarlywill be associatedwith low nominal interestrates.
The result is a positive association between interest rates and inflation590 Daniel K. Benjamin and Levis A. Kochin
rates. Since inflation rates will becorrelatedwith price levels, the result is
an observed correlation between interest rates and the price level.
Fisher (1930, chap. 19) found no evidence of a positive association
between current interest rates and current inflation rates, nor between
current interest rates and future inflation rates. However, he did find a
positive association between current interest rates and past inflation.
Arguing that pastinflation works with a lag onfuture interest rates via its
effects on expectations of future inflation, Fisher concluded that this
observed relationship both vindicated his theory and explained Gibson's
paradox. As Shiller and Siegel (1977) note, however, a distributed lag on
past inflation rates must necessarily be well correlated with the current
price level so that Fisher's finding may be nothing more than a restate-
ment of the paradox. Shiller and Siegel go on to present evidence,
assuming rational forecasting of inflation, suggesting that the Fisher
effect is woefully inadequate in explaining movements in interest rates
over the period 1729-1950.
Our purpose in this section is to demonstrate the following: (1) during
the gold standard period covered by Fisher, his postulated link between
pastinflation andcurrentinterestrates makesno sense; (2) duringthefull
sample of gold standard years, to explain nominal interest rates or
Gibson's paradox as resulting from changes in the expected inflation rate
makes no sense; (3) there may, in fact, be no Gibson's paradox to
explain.
To address these issues, we begin by inquiring into the time-series
propertiesoftheprice level. Table 13.1 shows the autocorrelationsofthe
log of the price level in Britain from 1729 to 1931. The high, slowly
decaying pattern revealed in table 13.1 (col. 1) is symptomaticofnonsta-
tionary series. Further evidence is contained in column (2), which dis-
plays the autocorrelations ofthe inflation rate (log Pt - log Pt - 1). Except
at one lag (and at lag 21), none ofthe autocorrelations is as much as two
standard errors from zero. The fact that the autocorrelation at one lag is
nearly three standard errors from zero suggests that the inflation rate
follows a first-order autoregressive process. However, the price-level
data that we are compelled to use are annually averaged data-they
reflect the average price level during each year. As Working (1960) has
shown, time-averaged data on an underlying process that follows a con-
tinuous random walk will tend to produce positive serial correlation at
onelag. To seethe tendency, considera rise in the price level during year
t. The observed (time-averaged) data will show a rise in prices from
period t - 1 to period t. The observed data will also show a rise in the
price level from periodt to periodt + 1, since the observedprice levelfor
period t is an averge ofthe lower price level that prevailed during part of
period t and the higher price level that prevailed during the remainderof
the period. Working calculated the theoretical value ofthe autocorrela-591 War, Prices, and Interest Rates





Log Pr alog Pt Rt aRt WARt aWARt Model
Order (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1 0.953 0.206 0.936 0.007 0.894 0.301 0.070
2 0.886 -0.091 0.870 -0.140 0.724 0.029 0.069
3 0.826 -0.099 0.823 0.083 0.548 0.026 0.069
4 0.773 -0.087 0.764 -0.009 0.365 -0.134 0.069
5 0.728 0.037 0.707 -0.135 0.213 -0.240 0.069
6 0.679 -0.060 0.666 0.009 0.111 -0.127 0.069
7 0.635 0.013 0.625 -0.036 0.035 -0.121 0.069
8 0.591 0.083 0.589 -0.095 -0.015 -0.177 0.068
9 0.538 0.050 0.563 0.076 -0.028 -0.104 0.068
10 0.482 -0.063 0.522 -0.029 -0.019 -0.137 0.068
11 0.429 -0.040 0.484 -0.085 0.021 -0.105 0.068
12 0.379 -0.028 0.461 -0.123 0.085 -0.050 0.068
13 0.335 0.028 0.455 0.021 0.165 0.075 0.068
14 0.289 -0.081 0.445 0.011 0.229 0.121 0.067
15 0.251 -0.100 0.435 0.093 0.268 0.161 0.067
16 0.221 -0.026 0.418 0.125 0.274 0.078 0.067
17 0.193 0.127 0.388 0.101 0.261 0.112 0.067
18 0.153 0.072 0.346 -0.063 0.221 0.059 0.067
19 0.108 -0.001 0.313 0.154 0.169 0.007 0.066
20 0.063 -0.006 0.263 -0.009 0.115 0.012 0.066
21 0.019 -0.155 0.214 -0.219 0.057 -0.002 0.066
22 -0.010 -0.065 0.192 0.119 -0.002 0.004 0.066
23 -0.033 -0.063 0.156 0.065 -0.061 -0.026 0.066
24 -0.052 -0.043 0.112 -0.139 -0.116 -0.086 0.066
Sources: Col. (1), annual averages ofwholesale prices from Mitchell and Deane 1962, pp.
468-70,474-75; col. (3), annual yield on annuities orconsols from Homer 1963, tables 13,
19, and 57; col. (5), reported nominal defense expendituresfrom Mitchell and Deane 1962,
pp. 389-91, 396-99.
Notes: Col. (5) adjusted as described in note 6, deflated by prices. The residuals from a log
linear trend over the period 1729-1931 were autocorrelated.
tion coefficient to be 0.25 at one lag and zero for lags longer than one
period. The autocorrelations revealed in table 13.1 (col. 2) are remark-
ably close to the pattern predicted by Working. The autocorrelation
coefficient at lag one is 0.21, well within one standarderrorofWorking's
theoretical value, and only one (at lag 21) of the remaining autocorrela-
tion coefficients is as much as two standard errors from zero. We cannot
reject the hypothesis thatthe price level followed a Martingale process in
Britainduring the gold standard years. Ifcorrect, the Martingalehypoth-
esis implies that there is no evidence ofpersistentinflation ordeflation in
Britain during the gold standard years. The secular "trends" in the price592 Daniel K. Benjamin and Levis A. Kochin
level that most investigators have found are the sorts oftricks ofthe eye
that arise as a result of the human tendency to perceive order-even
when none is present.
3
The implications ofthis finding are striking. First, it implies that there
shouldbenoFishereffectpresentduringtheyearsofthegoldstandard. If
the price level follows a Martingale, then the best estimate of the price
level in period t + 4 is the price level in period t, given available past
information on the inflation rate; equivalently, the best estimate of the
inflation rate in period t + i for all i is zero. Thus the "expectedinflation
rate" that will be rationally incorporated into nominal interest rates is
also zero, given the past information on the inflation rate. Second,
Fisher's finding that a distributed lag on past inflation rates is positively
correlated with current interest rates is utterly unrelated to the Fisher
effect. Giventhetime-series propertiesoftheinflation rate, a distributed
lag on past inflation rates is not the rational way to forecast future
inflation rates. The distributed-lag method offorecasting will be rational
onlyifinflation rates arepositivelyseriallycorrelated. Since they arenot,
no rational borrower or lender would use Fisher's proposed method of
forecasting.
The final issue involves the time-series properties of the long-term
interestrate. Table13.1 (col. 3) displays theautocorrelationsofthelevels
of the consol rate. Again, the high, slowly decaying pattern of autocor-
relation coefficients is suggestive of a nonstationary series. Table 13.1
(col. 4), which displays the autocorrelation coefficients ofthe first differ-
ence ofthe consol rate, reinforces this impression. Except atlag 21, none
ofthe coefficients are as much as two standard errors from zero. Again,
however, since these are time-averaged data, we should observe some
positive autocorrelation at one lag. The fact that we do not suggests that
the "true" underlying data probably reflect some negative autocorrela-
tion-which would be expected if there were episodic "crises" in which
interestrates rose andthenfell sharply. Theimportantpoint, however, is
that the interest-rate series, like the price series, is very close to being a
nonstationary series.
The simplest way ofdealing with two nonstationary series is to differ-
ence them to produce stationaryseries. Wehave doneso for boththe log
ofthe price level andthe consol rate, andthen estimatedthe relationship
between the two series. The results are as follows for 1729-1931 (with
t-statistics in parentheses):
(2) dRt= .006 + .365 dlog Pr.
(.33) (1.62)
R2 = .01, D.W. = 2.00.
Ateitherthe5percentlevelfor a two-tailedtestorthe 10percentlevelfor593 War, Prices, and Interest Rates
a one-tailed test, there is no significant relationship between the two
series. The only paradox here is whetherthere is anything left to explain.
13.3 War and Interest Rates
General William Tecumseh Sherman informed us that war is hell. We
have no fault with this description ofthe military attributes ofwar. Butif
one is interested in the economic attributes of war, it would be more
appropriate to say that war is purgatory. Hell is permanent; war is
temporary, and its salient economic effects arise from the temporary
increase in government expenditures that occurs during war.
The temporary rise in government expenditures during waris itselfthe
product of the change in intertemporal demands that occurs at the
outbreakofwar. Ifa nationsucceedsatwar, thepermanentincomesofits
citizens will be higher than if it fails. Success demands that resources be
available for use during the war: a rifle not produced until 1919 was ofno
use in fighting the battles ofWorld WarI. Thus during a war the demand
for currently available goods rises relative to the demand for goods
availablein the (postwar) future. Thechangeinintertemporaldemands is
converted into an intertemporal reallocation ofresources via a rise in the
real rate of interest.
To see how temporary wartime expenditures produce a rise in the
interest rate, we shall employ a simple two-period model of a closed
economy in which the current period is war and the future period is
postwar peace. Strictly for expositional convenience, we assume that all
individuals are identicalso thatwe canemploythedevice ofa representa-
tive individual. The model is depicted in figure 13.3 where current goods
are measured along the horizontal axis and future goods along the verti-
cal axis. The economy's initial endowment is shown by the point (Eo, E1)
through which runs its productive transformation locus, LL. Absent the
war and the representative individual will choose a productive (and
consumptive) optimumatA where the indifference curve Uois tangentto
LL. The common values ofthe marginal rates ofsubstitution and trans-
formation equal - (1 + r), where r is the real interest rate. Current and
future consumption are shown by (Yo, Yl) and investment (which equals
savings) is shown by Eo - Yo.
Consider now the onset of war, and assume that the war is financed
wholly via current taxes. If these taxes equal Eo - Eo then the endow-
ment available for nonwar activities becomes (Eo, E1) and the new
transformation locus for nonwar activities becomes LL', which is every-
where to the left ofLLby the amount Eo - Eo, Le., by the amountofthe
currentresources being used to fight thewar. Howwill society respond to
the lack ofgoods currently available for nonwar activities? Consider first






Current and future consumption in war and peace.
reducing investment to such a level that the burden of the war is borne
solely out of future consumption. Since LL' is a horizontal transforma-
tion ofLL, the slope ofLL' at C must be steeper than the slope ofLL at
A. However if both current and future consumption are superior goods,
the indifference curve passing through Cmust be flatter than the indiffer-
ence curve passing through A, implying an excess demand for future
goods and an excess supply of current goods. Hence the wartime opti-
mum must be above C on LL'. Consider now point B, which would
involve maintainingprewarlevels ofinvestmentandfuture consumption,
and thus absorbing the entirety of the rise in taxes out of an equal
reduction in currentconsumption. Since LL' is simply a horizontal trans-
formation of LL, the slope of LL' at B equals the slope of LL at A.
However, given superiority ofboth current and future consumption, the
slope of the indifference curve passing through B must be steeper than
the slope ofthe indifference curve passing through A. Hence at B there
would be an excess demand for current goods and an excess supply of
future goods, implying a new optimum, such as at D, between points B
and C. The new optimum thus involves reductions in both current con-
sumption and investment. Since the optimum must lie below B, the
marginal rate of transformation (and substitution) must be greater than
before-the interest rate must rise.595 War, Prices, and Interest Rates
Our assumption that current taxes are used to finance the war bears
little relationship to the observed behavior ofgovernments, which in fact
finance wars largely through borrowing. However, the analysis de-
velopedfor taxation applies exactly ifdomestic borrowing is the means of
finance. Itis ultimatelyneithertaxation norborrowingthat"finances"the
war: it is current goods that otherwise would be consumed or invested
that finance the war. In the case of taxation the confiscation of current
goods for war use produces an excess demand for current goods; as
individuals attempt to borrow to finance current consumption, the in-
terest rate rises until the excess demand is eliminated. In the case of
deficit finance the government signals the excess demand by bidding up
the interest rate via its borrowing activities. In either event, if Eo - Eo
units of current goods are to be extracted from private use, their price
must be bid up--the interest rate must rise.
Severalfacets ofthe precedinganalysis are worth emphasizing. First, it
is the temporary nature ofthe war and the prospectoffuture peace thatis
central to the analysis. In the event of a permanent rise in "wasteful"
government expenditures (such as defense expenditures), involving an
equal reduction in both current and future goods available for private
uses, a rise in the interest rate would be no more likely than a decline.
4
Wars fundamentally involve a paucity of goods currently available for
consumption and investment purposes relative to the amount of those
goods that will be available in the future. The attempts by individuals to
smooth their consumption over time creates an excess demand for cur-
rent goods and the ensuing rise in the interest rate.
Second, the relevant real-world interest rate is the one that applies
between war and (postwar) peace. There is no reason for intrawar (e.g.,
very short-term) interest rates to rise, unless the probability is positive
that the war will end before the short-term obligation comes due. To see
this point, consider a simple world in which there are only two types of
debt obligations: short-term and long-term. The short-term obligations
are of annual duration and are issued (and repaid) in June of each year.
The long-term obligations are consols, i.e., perpetuities with fixed
coupon payments. Suppose that, absent war, both short- and long-term
interest rates would be 5 percent per annum. Assume now that in June
1913 it becomesknownwithcertaintythatawarwill beginin August 1914
and continue with uniform intensity until November 1918. Since there
still will be peace in June 1914, the relative amounts ofincome available
for nonwar uses in June of 1913 and 1914 are unchanged and the corre-
sponding short rate of interest will be unchanged. In June 1914, short-
term rates will be substantially below 5 percent (and perhaps even nega-
tive), reflecting the·abundance of goods available then relative to (war-
time) June 1915. Short-term obligations issued in June 1915 (and 1916
and 1917) will again bear 5 percent interest rates since the (depleted)596 Daniel K. Benjamin and Levis A. Kochin
amounts ofresources available for nonwar uses will be identical through
June 1918. In the latter month, newly issued short-term obligations will
bear sharply higher interest rates, reflecting the paucity of goods avail-
able then relative to (postwar) June 1919.
Long-term rates will follow a slightly more complex pattern. The
"announcement"in June 1913 ofthefuture warwill be accompanied by a
slight decline in long-term rates since the depressed 1914-15 short rate
implicit in thelong rateis closerin time thanis theelevated 1918-19short
rate. The long rate will continue to decline slowly until the onset of the
war, at which point it will rise sharply (since it now only incorporates the
elevated 1918-19 short rate). The long rate will rise slowly as the war
progresses, reflecting the increasing importance of the advancing 1918-
19 short rate.
5 The long rate will peak just before the end of the war,
droppping thereafter to the peacetime level of 5 percent.
The third point to note is that opening the economy to allow for
borrowing from abroad does not change the qualitative effects of our
analysis unless the supply offunds from other nations is perfectly elastic.
As long as the supply offoreign funds is positively sloped, the attempt by
belligerent nations to borrow will generate an inflow of foreign capital
(from neutrals) that will dampen but not eliminate the rise in the real
interest rate. The dampening effect of borrowing from neutrals arises
because such borrowing enables a belligerent nation to convert a purely
temporary war into a partially permanent war.
The final point worth emphasizing is that the wartime rise in interest
rates is nota consequence of"Keynesianmyopia" (the sufferers ofwhich
fail to perceivethefuture tax liabilitiesimpliedbycurrentdeficit finance).
Infact, the Fisherianparadigmwe have used to generateourimplications
corresponds in spirit most closely with "Ricardian omniscience," since
our representative consumer clearly perceives the current and future
implications of all actions. If the world is characterized by Keynesian
myopia, the effects of war on the interest rate will be enhanced, since
consumers, thinking their future incomes to be higher than they will in
fact be, will attemptevenmorestrenuouslytomaintaincurrentconsump-
tion, thus producing a larger increase in the interest rate. One important
implication is that attempts to distinguish between Keynesian and Ricar-
dian views of the world must control for the effects of wars on interest
rates.
To test our theory, we have constructed a measure of "abnormal"
defense expenditures; we refer to this series as WAR, subscripted to
indicatewhetherit is contemporaneous(t) orprecedes thecurrentperiod
by i periods (t - i). We began by summing togetherfor each year British
expenditures on army, navy, and ordnance and then deflating the sum by
our measure of the price leve1.
6 We refer to this deflated sum as real
defense expenditures (D). We then estimated a log lineartrend (log D =597 War, Prices, and Interest Rates
a + ~t + E) over the sample period 1729-1931. The residuals from this
regression (the deviations of real defense expenditures from their trend
value) are the series we call WAR; its· values are shown graphically in
figure 13.2 above and its autocorrelations in table 13.1 (col. 5).7
Our rationale for this measure is two-fold. First, if defense expendi-
tures are really defensive, their long-run absolute level should be related
to that which is being defended-the wealth ofthe country (see Thomp-
son 1974). Using measured, current income as a proxy for wealth, the
ratio ofdefense expenditures to income should thus tend to be a station-
ary (mean-reverting) series. We lack an annual time series on British
national income priorto 1855, but know from otherwork (Benjamin and
Kochin 1979, 1982) that the log of real income in Britain can be simply,
albeit crudely, represented as a time trend (but see Nelson and Kang
1981, for precautions about placing too literal an interpretation on this
representation). Hence oursupposition that "normal" defense expendi-
tures follow a log linear trend.
Our second reason for using this measure is based on our notion that
there are identifiable periods of abnormal and normal defense expendi-
tures. When real expenditures are extraordinarily high or low, people
expect them to return (eventually, if not immediately) to historically
typical levels; it is this expectation that generates the forces on the
interest rate that we have discussed. The use of deviations from the log
lineartrend ofreal defense expenditures captures this notion because the
trend representation implicitly forces the deviations from trend to be
mean reverting.
8
Given our measure of abnormal defense expenditures, there remains
the question ofthe correct methodofestimatingits effects onthe interest
rate. Ourtheoryimplies that the level ofdefense expenditures relative to
their normal level should be positively related to the level ofthe interest
rate. If the interest rate were a stationary variable, we could simply
estimate Rt = a + b WARt + Et • Given the nonstationarityoftheinterest
rate, that course is inappropriate; statistical considerations dictate that
we estimate the effect ofwaronchanges in the interest rate. Fortunately,
ourtheory implies thatchanges in the level ofabnormal defense expen~i­
turesshould be positively related to changes in the interest r(~.te. Estirri~t­
ing the relationship over the period 1729-1931 yields the following (with
t-statistics in parentheses):
(3) dRt = .006 + 0.24 dWARt •
(.35) (3.51)
R2 = .06, D.W. = 2.11.
Two pointsare clearfrom this regression. First, ourtheoryis consistent
with the evidence. At a high level of confidence we can reject the598 Daniel K. Benjamin and Levis A. Kochin
hypothesis that interest rates are independent of abnormal defense ex-
penditures. Second, changes in the consol rate are largely determined by
factors other than defense expenditures, at least as judged by the low R
2
of this regression. In part the low "explanatory.power" results from our
use of the consol rate as a measure of "the" interest rate. Although the
consol rate has the advantage of incorporating the implicit short rate
between any future period of war and peace, it has the disadvantage of
incorporating all otherfuture short rates as well. Inpartourchoice ofthe
empirical counterpartto "the" interest rate suffers from the defect inher-
ent in any interest rate measure: it is impossible ex post to measure the
interest rate relevant between war and peace ex ante.
Although equation (3) is a relatively poor predictor on average for the
full sample period as a whole, it does surprisingly well when it matters
most: periods ofwar. Forexample, from 1913 until the WorldWarI peak
in 1917, the consol rate rose 119 basis points; equation (3) predicts a
change of 65 basis points. To take a more remote example, of the
104-basis-point rise in the consol rate from 1753 to 1761 (during the
French and Indian War), equation (3) predicts a rise of 43 basis points.
For the seven wars in our sample, equation (3) predicts between one-
third and one-halfofthe movements (from either trough to peakorpeak
to trough) in the consol rate. The apparent predictive inadequacies of
equation (3) are thus largely a result ofits failure in peacetime-whenwe
would not expect it to predict well in any event.
13.4 War and Prices
War and inflation have tended to occur together. During the two
centuriescovered by ourdatathe highest pricelevels are observedduring
and immediately after the Napoleonic Wars and World War I. The
highest inflation rates in our data are observed during and immediately
after the same wars. The concurrence between war and inflation is no
accident.
The best-known cause of the link between war and inflation is the
tendency for the governments of belligerent nations to issue fiat money
during the course of the hostilities. The onset of a (less-than-fully-
anticipated) war implies a rise in the present value ofcurrent and future
government expenditures. If these expenditures are to be financed, the
present value of current and future taxes must necessarily rise. If the
marginal resource costs of taxation increase as the value of the tax
collections increase relative to the value of what is being taxed, then
efficient public finance requires that (1) both current and future taxes be
raised to keep the marginal costs o~ taxation constant over time, and (2)
taxes be raised "across the board" to keep the marginal costs oftaxation
equal across taxed entities. The issue of fiat money, and the ensuing599 War, Prices, and Interest Rates
inflation it produces, provides the means oftaxing (non-interest-bearing)
money during wars.
The incentive to use fiat-money issue as a means oftaxation exists for
all countries. Butfor countriesonthe gold standardthere is an additional
attraction to issuing fiat money. The gold reserves held by the govern-
ment of a gold standard country can be thought of as an investment in
brand-namecapital, valuable to the extent thatthey induce confidence in
the country's money. As discussed above, the onset ofwar produces an
increase in the value of goods now relative to goods later. The ensuing
rise in the rate of interest creates an incentive to convert capital goods
into currentlyavailable goods. Onemeans ofdoing so is by disinvestingin
the stock ofbrand-name capital behind the belligerent's moneysupply-
printing fiat money, driving up the price level, and allowing gold reserves
to flow abroad in search of lower-priced imports. Equivalently, one can
think of the citizens of a belligerent nation as simply substituting paper
for gold and shipping the latter to neutrals, thereby converting their
confidence capital into imports ofcurrent goods and services that can be
used to fight the war.
There is a second reason for wartime inflations in belligerent nations,
one that is less well recognized but one that also helps explain the
substantial deviations from purchasing-power parity that are commonly
observedin wartime.
9The onset ofwarimplies that (1) currentgoods rise
in value relative to future goods in belligerent nations and (2) currently
available goods rise in value in belligerent nations relative to their value
in neutral nations. The latter change in relative valuations implies that
the real terms of trade should change so as to increase the real price of
goods in belligerent nations relative to their real price in neutral nations.
This provides the impetus for the large current-account deficit (excess of
imports over exports ofcurrent goods) that enables belligerents to wage
war. The rise in real interest rates implied by (1) provides the means by
which the current-account deficit is financed by capital "exports," i.e.,
increased borrowing from abroad, for the relative rise in interest rates in
belligerent nations attracts the foreign capital necessary to finance the
current-account deficit. The rise in interest rates in belligerent nations is
also the mechanism by which the relative prices in belligerent nations
increase and the means by which the deviation from purchasing-power
parity occurs. Absent the rise in belligerent interest rates, imports of
goods could exceed exports only by the net outflow of gold. The rise in
belligerent interest rates simultaneously permits (1) the direct link be-
tween a net inflow ofgoods and outflow ofgold to be broken; (2) a rise in
the relative price of goods in belligerent nations to occur; and (3) a
deviation from purchasing-power parity that "favors" belligerent na-
tions. The first ofthese events is a self-evident matterofaccounting. The
othertwo are more intricately related. Absent the rise in the interest rate(4)
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in belligerentnations, the relative price levelin thosecountrieswould not
deviate (far) from the price level in neutralcountries, since the outflow of
gold would equalize price levels quickly. A relative change in prices and
the associated rise in imports of goods relative to exports of goods are
made possible only by the rise in interest rates in belligerent nations,
since it is this rise in interest rates that makes people willing to hold the
belligerent's obligations. A concomitant effect is that the purchasing-
power value of a belligerent currency rises relative to the value to be
expected simply by looking at price levels because ofthe increased value
of holdings of the belligerent's obligations.
Thepositive association betweenwar andinflation from 1729 to 1931 is
graphically illustrated in the following simple regression (with t-statistics
in parentheses):10
~log Pt= .002 + .037 WARt-I.
(.031) (4.15)
R2 = .09, D.W. = 1.62.
Some may find our discussion of war and prices puzzling in a paper
preparedfor a conference on the gold standard. After all, the issue offiat
money at rates unrelated to gold holdings seems hardly descriptive ofany
goldstandardrule. Yetwaris notarecentinvention. Lookingaheadfrom
any of the dates in our sample, few except the aged could have felt
confident that war was ruled out in their lifetimes. Even in the aftermath
of victory in the War to End All Wars the prospect of war remained.
In 1919 Lloyd George told the service chiefs that they need not antici-
pate a major war within the next ten years. In 1925 the service chiefs
asked again and were given the same answer: no majorwar within the
next ten years. This answer was repeated in 1926 and 1927. Finally, in
1928, the service chiefs were told, on Churchill's prompting, that they
need ask no more: the ten years' freedom from major war began
automaticallyeachmorning. Thisinstructionwas revokedonlyin 1932.
(Taylor 1965, p. 228)
In our sample the yield on consols averaged 3.6 percent; thus on
average, half of the present value was due to payments made beyond
twenty years. The possibility ofwar and ofa consequent departure from
peacetime gold standard rules must surely have been a nontrivial consid-
eration for the holders of consols. Moreover, much of the apparent
price-level security ofthe gold standard derives from a tendency for past
observers to focus onthesuccess stories. Itis truethatBritainreturnedto
gold atprewarparityafterboththeNapoleonicWars andWorldWarI, as
did the Union after the Civil War and the United States after World War
I. Yet when France returned to gold after World War I, she did so at a
rate that was only one-fifth ofthe prewar level-a rate that surely would(5)
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have overjoyed the holders of Confederate currency in 1866 or Reichs-
marks in 1923. Theprice-level securityofa gold standardis in this respect
no different from the price-level security of any monetary standard-it
exists only so long as the government remains committedto astable price
level.
13.5 War, Prices, and Interest Rates
The results we have obtained thus far yield two conclusions: (1) the
apparent association between the interest rate and the price level is
largely spurious, and (2) prices and interest rates tend to move together
due to the common influence of wars on both. The question we briefly
address in this section is the obvious one: Is the combined effect ofthese
two facts enough to eliminate the apparent association between the
interest rate and the price level? As equation (4) and footnote 10 show,
only the lagged value of abnormal defense expenditures (WARt-I) has
an effect on the inflation rate. In equation (5) we hold the inflation rate
constant. Thus it is necessary to decompose ~WARt into its components
(WARtandWARt-I) so thattheirpossiblydifferentialeffectsonR, given
that the inflation rate is held constant, can be taken into account. Doing
so yields the following results (with t-statistics in parentheses):




R2 = .10, D.W. = 2.18.
Once the effects of wars are accounted for, the weak relationship be-
tween prices and interest rates present in equation (2) disappears for all
practical purposes. Gibson's paradox is the spurious product of war's
effect on both prices and interest rates and not the result ofany indepen-
dent effects of prices on interest rates.
ll
13.6 Conclusion
During the more than two centuries that Britain was (with two inter-
ruptions) onthegold standard, thereis no evidenceofpersistenttrendsin
either the price level or theconsol interest rate. Both the price level and
the yield on consols moved in what was essentially a random walk. The
comovement of the price level and the level of the interest rate so
apparent to the eye is largely visual spurious regression. In significant
partthemovementsofboththe interestrate andthe price level have been
producedby war. Once theinfluence ofwaris takeninto account, there is602 Daniel K. Benjamin and Levis A. Kochin
virtually no evidence of any linkage between the price level and the
long-term interest rate.
Notes
1. Our interest-rate series is from Homer 1963, tables 13, 19, and 57. We use annuities
until 1752 and consols thereafter except for 188{}-88 when the possibility of redemption at
parmadeconsol yields abnormallyhigh. FollowingHomer'ssuggestionwe use yields on2.5
percent annuities for 188{}-88. The wholesale price index (Mitchell and Deane 1962, pp.
468-70, 474-75) links the Schumpeter-Gilboy (consumers' goods), Gayer, Rostow and
Schwartz (domestic and imported commodities), and the Sauerbeck-Statist (overall) in-
dexes.
2. See Hall 1980 for an alternative discussion of the effects of temporary defense
expenditures on the interest rate.
3. We refer to the log of the price level as a Martingale rather than a random walk
because a Martingale has serially uncorrelated changes but not necessarily random and
independently distributed changes. Random changes would be random in either actual or
absolute values. We find no evidence in the autocorrelation of price changes in Britain
under the gold standard of systematic inflations or deflations, but there is systematic
evidence of disturbed and quiet subperiods. The autocorrelations of the absolute value of
changes in the log ofthe price level are significantly positively autocorrelated at lags out to
six periods. This, together with the earlier results, says that when the price level changed
under the gold standard there was no way oftelling what direction the change would go in
th~ next year. On the other hand, there was strong reason to anticipate that large changes
would be followed by large changes and small changes by small changes.
4. Indeed, with homothetic preferences, the interest rate would remain unchanged.
5. The intrawar rises in the long rate will befurther stimulated bytheongoing deprecia-
tion of the capital stock.
6. Reported nominal defense expenditures, from Mitchell and Deane (1962, pp. 389-
99), present several difficulties. First, during most of World War I and some of the
Napoleonic Wars, the extraordinary military expenditures were "financed" with "votes of
credit," with little or no detail shown in the records as to the disposition ofthe expenditure
among army, navy, and ordnance. We added the votes ofcredit to the detail where shown
andused thevotesofcredit alonewhere no detail atall is shown. Thesecondproblemis that
the available defense-expenditure data are for fiscal rather than calendar years. Third, the
datingoffiscal yearschangesfour times duringoursample. For1727-54, thefiscal yearends
26 September; for 1755-99, it ends 10 October; for 1800-1854 it ends 5 January; in 1855, it
ends 5 April; from then until the end of our sample, it ends 31 March. Finally, the series
reports disbursements of funds rather than authorizations of expenditures.
The principal economic effects of defense expenditures that we are concerned with
would be expected to occur when the men and materials are ordered rather than when the
cash disbursements happento bemade. We arbitrarily assumed thatthe lag betweenorders
and disbursements is three months. Thus the disbursements reported for fiscal year 1740
(ending 26 September 1740) would reflect ordersplaced during the last months of1739 and
the first six months of 1740. On the further assumption that disbursements (and the
accompanying orders) are uniform throughout a given fiscal year, the value of the orders
placedduringcalendaryear1740equalonehalfofthedisbursementsfor fiscal year1740 and
one half ofthe disbursements for fiscal year 1741. We also assumed that (1) 26 September
and 10 October are the same date (1 October); (2) 5January is 1January; and (3) 5 April is603 War, Prices, and Interest Rates
31 March. Indexing calendar years by t and fiscal years by 7, we thus have the following
algorithms for converting fiscal-year data into calendar-year data. For 1727-99,
t = 1/2(7) + 1/2(7 + 1);
for 1800-1854,
t = 3/4(7 + 1) + 1/4(7 + 2) ;
and for 1855-1931,
t = 7 + 1.
7. Theserialcorrelationsof LlWARdisplay-inaddition to theWorking autocorrelation
at one lag-a significant tendency for negative autocorrelation at lags 4 to 10. There is a
significant tendencyfor positivevalues ofLlWARto befollowed by negativevalues infour to
ten years. Wars (unlike "high" prices) tend to end.
8. An alternative to ourmethod is to fit a time-series model to real defense expenditures
and to use the difference between actual expenditures and forecasts offuture expenditures
as a measure ofwar. Two shortcomings of the alternative may be noted. First, what is the
relevant future against which the present is to be compared? Second, the magnitude of
defense spending in World War I is so large relative to the rest ofthe sample that the fitted
model will be dominated by the few observations of those years, a problem that is less
significant with the approach we chose.
9. See, for example, Friedman and Schwartz 1963, pp. 199-203.
10. Similar results are obtained by regressing the inflation rate on the current value of
WAR. However, when both current and lagged values are included, only the coefficient of
the lagged value is significant. These results suggest that it takes about a year for defense
expenditures to have an impact on the inflation rate.
11. Even ifwars are the complete explanation for Gibson's paradox, the price level may
still appear to exert an independent influence on the interest rate in a regression such as
equation (5). As noted earlier, the outbreakofa warinvolving Britainwill drive upinterest
rates and prices in Britain. This will produce an outflow of gold in search of lower-priced
goods from abroad and a search for borrowers abroadwho are willing to lend atlower rates
ofinterest. Bothforces will tendto generate a rise in prices abroadas well as a rise ininterest
rates abroad. The same analysis holds in reverse for foreign wars: hostilities elsewhere will
generate a rise in both the price level and the interest rate in Britain, holding the level of
defense expenditures in Britain constant. We have fragmentary evidence ofthis force from
America; during the Mexican-American War of 1846-47 and the Civil War, both the
interest rate and the price level rose in Britain, even as the real level of British defense
expenditures was declining. Controlling for foreign wars would of course require global
information on real defense expenditures.
References
Barro, Robert J. 1981. Output effects ofgovernment purchases. Journal
ofPolitical Economy 89 (Dec.): 1086-1122.
Benjamin, Daniel K., and Levis A. Kochin. 1979. Searching for an
explanation ofunemployment in interwar Britain. Journal ofPolitical
Economy 87 (June): 441-78.
---. 1982. Unemployment and unemployment benefits in twentieth-
century Britain. Journal ofPolitical Economy 90 (Apr.): 410-36.604 Daniel K. Benjamin and Levis A. Kochin
Cannan, Edwin. 1925. The paper pound of1797-1821. London: P. S.
King and Son.
Fama, Eugene F. 1975. Short-term interest rates as predictors of infla-
tion. American Economic Review 65 (June): 269-82.
Feinstein, Charles. 1972. Nationalincome, expenditure, andoutputin the
United Kingdom, 1855-1965. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Fisher, Irving. 1930. The theory ofinterest. New York: Macmillan.
Friedman, Milton, andAnnaJ. Schwartz. 1963. A monetaryhistoryofthe
United States, 1867-1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Granger, C. W. J., and P. Newbold. 1974. Spurious regressions in
econometrics. Journal ofEconometrics 2 (July): 111-20.
Hall, Robert E. 1980. Labor supply and aggregate fluctuations. Carne-
gie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 12 (Spring): 7-33.
Homer, Sidney. 1963. A history ofinterest rates. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers University Press.
Keynes, John M. 1930. A treatise on money. London: Macmillan.
Klein, Benjamin. 1975. Our new monetary standard. Economic Inquiry
13 (Dec.): 461-84.
Mitchell, BrianR., andPhyllis Deane. 1962. AbstractofBritish historical
statistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nelson, Charles R., and Heejoon Kang. 1981. Spurious periodicity in
inappropriately detrended time series. Econometrica 49 (May): 741-
51.
Shiller, Robert J., and Jeremy J. Siegel. 1977. The Gibson paradox and
historical movements in real interest rates. Journal ofPolitical Econ-
omy 85 (Oct.): 891-908.
Taylor, A. J. P. 1965. English history, 1914-1945. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Thompson, Earl A. 1974. Taxation and national defense. Journal of
Political Economy 82 (July/August): 755-82.
Working, Holbrook. 1960. Note on the correlation offirst differences of
averages in a random chain. Econometrica 28 (Oct.): 916-18.
Comment Phillip Cagan
Mr. Gibson's Paradox-Was It There?
The Gibsonparadoxhas played a long and notorious role in the history
ofmonetarytheory. Itappearstodefytheprinciplesofclassical monetary
Phillip Cagan is professor of economics and chairman of the department at Columbia
University, a research associate ofthe NationalBureauofEconomicResearch, and adjunct
and visiting scholar with the American Enterprise Institute.605 War, Prices, and Interest Rates
theory. According to the quantitytheory ofmoney, long-run movements
in the price level reflect correspondingmovements in the stock ofmoney.
Since increases in the money supply also tend to ease financial markets,
monetary increases that raise prices should also depress interest rates.
The implication is that interest rates should be low when prices are rising
and high when prices are falling. The Gibson paradox, that interest rates
and prices move togetherin the same direction, appears to contradict the
classical theory.
I have argued elsewhere (1972) thatinsofar as monetarychanges affect
interest rates because ofmovements along the money-demand schedule,
theso-called liquidity effect, such an effectwill be transitory. Ifmonetary
changes have long-run effects on interest rates, they must reflect a saving
ofthe revenuefrom moneycreationwherebytherevenue is nottreatedas
ordinary income and spent on consumption. That the revenue from
money creation would be treated differently from ordinary income is
opento question, however, so far as long-run movements are concerned.
Therefore, conventional monetarytheory does not necessarilyimplythat
increases in the money stock reduce interest rates, and, while conven-
tional theory cannot explain the paradox, they are not in opposition.
Nevertheless, many antiquantity theorists delight in pointing to the
paradox in support of their various anticlassical arguments. One of the
earliest ofthese theorists, Thomas Tooke, who had a cost-of-production
theory ofthe price level, argued that interest rates were a cost ofproduc-
tion and had a positive effect on prices. Ricardo and Wicksell disposed of
that explanation on the correct argument that interest rates influence
relative prices, not the general price level, though Tooke's theory con-
tinues to be popular with the public and the press. Other explanations
have neverbeenin shortsupply. Gibsonhimselfbelievedthatthe "costof
living" influenced saving, so that low prices increased the supply of
loanable funds and lowered interest rates. Thatexplanation is unsatisfac-
tory, as was noted by Keynes (1930), who brought Mr. Gibson's articles
to the noticeofeconomists andenshrinedhis nameon theparadox. Hicks
(1950, p. 154n) proposed that short-term rates rose more sharply in the
cyclical upswings when the secular growth in money is higher and pre-
sumably more variable; consequently, bond yields, which are an average
ofshort-termrates, tendto remain higherwhen secularmonetarygrowth
is higher. Hawtrey (1913) had the traditional view that wages lag prices
anddo so by more, thefasterprices rise; lowerrealwages raiseprofitsand
the real rate of interest. Macaulay (1938) claimed that rising prices are
favorable to investment expenditures, an expansion of which increases
borrowing and interest rates. More recently Shiller and Siegel (1977)
have proposed that rising prices are unanticipated and shift wealth from
lenders to borrowers, which reduces the net demand for financial assets
and raises interest rates, and conversely for falling prices.606 Daniel K. Benjamin and Levis A. Kochin
An influential explanation was proposed by Wicksell (1936) and inde-
pendently by Keynes (1930). They posited secular fluctuations in invest-
mentdemand. Thesefluctuations affected thesupply ofmoney-through
the banking system for Wicksell and through the central bank's reserve
ratio for Keynes. These fluctuations caused correspondingfluctuations in
bothinterestrates and the moneysupply, and thelatterin turn accounted
for the behavior of prices. This explanation therefore relied on the
quantity theory for the price effect. While velocity movements could
conceivably finance part of investment fluctuations over the business
cycle, an explanation of the long-run price movements in the Gibson
paradox could not be attributed to velocity and required corresponding
movements in the money supply. The fact that rising prices were accom-
panied by rising rather than higher interest rates could also be explained
by supposing that the banking system or central bank responded to
increases in investment by gradually expanding the money supply and
raising interest rates. Each rise in interest rates was necessary to induce a
further decline in reserve ratios and increase in the money supply.
The fluctuations in investment demand were not explained but were
taken as given, which was easy to accept in an age concerned with the
instability of the private economy as symbolized by Kondratieff cycles,
Schumpeter's creative destruction of capitalistic industry, and Keynes's
animal spirits of businessmen.
The Keynes-Wicksell theory is a plausible theory, and I have no
objections to it except that it is inconsistent with the evidence, as I
pointed out in my study of the U.S. money supply (1965). Their theory
implies that secular movements in the moneystock are due to the reserve
ratio of banks or the central bank, whereas in fact such secular move-
ments were due to high-powered money and growth ofthe gold stock in
relation to total output. The gold stock is not related positively to prices
orinterest rates. Ifanything, the relation would be inverse. Higherprices
and interest rates discourage gold production, and its positive association
with prices reflects the quantity theory of money.
The explanation for the Gibson paradox which is accepted by most
monetary theorists today, as noted by Benjamin and Kochin, is Irving
Fisher's-that nominal interest rates adjust to the rate ofdepreciation in
the value of money. It has spawned a lively research industry to deter-
mine whether it fits the evidence. Benjamin and Kochin intend to spoil
the fun by announcing, "Gentlemen, the object of your obsession does
not exist!" which leaves nothing to explain except the obsession itself.
They make the impressive argument that in the British data for the
period 1729 to 1931, government defense expenditures account for the
large fluctuations in prices and interest rates. These expenditures have
the same effect as investment does for Keynes and Wicksell, but the
sourceoftheinstabilityin theeconomyis cleverlyshiftedfrom theprivate607 War, Prices, and Interest Rates
sector to the government. Benjamin and Kochin argue that defense
expenditures will be partly financed by money creation and partly by
borrowing and that the latter will raise interest rates. They go to great
pains to argue that this is a "rational" response ofthe economy. Accord-
ing to the latest fashion, if it isn't rational it is not supposed to exist. But
whether rational ornot, I have no difficulty in accepting such an effect of
defense expenditures as simply an historical fact. When these large
fluctuations in interest and prices owing to defense expenditures are
removed, not much worth mentioning remains.
So far, so good. Then the authors put the Gibson paradox to the acid
test by regressing the change in interest rates on the change in defense
expenditures and the change in the log ofprices. Amazingly, the paradox
hangs on. The price variable is significant, but only marginally. In the
version of the paper presented at the conference, their present equation
(5) had only one WARterm and the t-statistic for dlog Pt was 1.97. In the
presentversion of(5),WARt- 1has beenadded andthetondlog Ptdrops
to 1.3.
Band K are relentless debunkers. At the conference they argued that
the significant but anemic evidence of the paradox probably reflects
foreign wars, since defense expenditures abroad would have repercus-
sions on Britain similar to the domestic effect. In the present version of
the paper they have found an equationform that reduces thesignificance
of the paradox.
I would be more sympathetic to the paradox. Their regression corre-
lates concurrent changes in the interest rate and prices, putting a heavy
empirical burden on the paradox and the Fisher explanation. This is so,
because the concurrent changes may miss the long-run swings in these
series and probably do not properly represent the expected changes in
prices. I suspect one could shore up the significance of the Fisher effect
with a lagged term or two. The authors justify the use of concurrent
changes on the grounds that the level of interest rates and prices in the
period tested display the propertyofrandomwalks. This is notsurprising
since the cyclical movements are quite erratic, and the series display little
overall trend from the beginning to the end ofthe period..The statistical
problemwith randomwalks is thattheyproduce drift, andtwo suchseries
can be correlated even if they are completely independent.
However, the longer-run upward and downward movements thatform
the Gibson paradox number only three in the British data and essentially
but two in the U.S. data from the mid-1800s to World War I. Even these
few observationsofthe longer-run movements are partlyobscuredbythe
large short-run fluctuations due to wars and crises. Therefore, it is not
surprising that when these fluctuations are not removed and the periods
not specially selected, little evidence of the paradox or Fisher effect
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lower frequency movements in U.S. interest rates and price changes, on
the assumption thatthe Fishereffect pertainedmainly to such longer-run
movements, and found no consistent relation for a variety of periods.
Contraryto the earliermore sympathetic search for the Fishereffect, the
recent skeptical investigations conclude that there is no solid evidence of
it.
I count myself among the first to welcome this skeptical turnaround in
econometrics. For a long time the journalshave beenfilled, and unfortu-
nately still are, with allegedly significant regressions that probably mean
nothing. But now the new ARIMA techniques of purging the data of
systematic movements to avoid spurious correlation are showing thatit is
difficult to demonstrate anything. That is probably as it should be. Yet
when Benjamin and Kochin classify interest and prices under the gold
standard as randomwalks and nothing more, I get uneasy. I am not sorry
to see the Gibson paradox go, but I think the Fisher effect is getting the
bum's rush.
I do not wish to deprecate the long overdue revival ofskeptical econ-
ometrics. Indeed, I welcome it and support it. But at the same time I
would notforget about type-two errorin the new zeal notto commit type
one. Type-two error, as some may need reminding since it is so seldom
mentioned in economics, is the rejection of hypotheses that are in fact
true. I am notanexpert, butI suspectthatmanyofthenewstatisticaltests
that are rejecting very plausible relationships are weak tests, in the sense
of having type-two errors. For one thing, regression equations impose a
rigid timing relationship on datawhen in fact the relationship is probably
variable. My eye may see random walks as trends, as Benjamin and
Kochin warn, but by the same token my eye may be able to make
allowances that are beyond the capability ofdumb regression equations.
My nostalgia for the old-fashioned qualitative analysis is not meant to be
critical ofBenjamin and Kochin, who have given us an excellent paper. I
am simply reluctant to accept completely theirwell-reasoned conclusion.
How far then might a case for the Fishereffect be carried? Letme start
with the Cartesian proposition that the Fisher effect is not a figment of
ourimaginations. It really does exist! No one could be sure ofthis before
the 1970s, buttoday there is no doubt. There is simply no way to account
for the high nominal interest rates since the late 1960s, which have
remained far above historical levels, without the Fisher effect.
The only question is whether the effect would operate under the
traditional gold standard. One might argue that it wouldn't. The gold
standard, after all, gave a strong guarantee of a certain degree of price
stability, seemingly eradicating expectations ofpersistent price changes.
But prices were not in fact completely stable. U.S. wholesale prices,
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thecycle inwhich the 1879 resumptionoccurredtothe 1893-95cycle over
a decade later at a rate of2.4 percent per year and rose thereafter to the
1907-10 cycle at a rate of2.5 percent peryear. Itis a question relevant to
the topic of this conference whether during these periods of the gold
standard there was a change in expectations, first ofdeclining prices and
then ofrising prices. It was not impossible, certainly, for expectations to
change. No one at the time could be sure that the gold stock would grow
just the right amount to produce perfect price stability. I think it is quite
plausible thattheprice movementsofthepre-WorldWarI period, which
though random from year to year persisted for about two decades first
downward and then upward, would be recognized as trends whose dura-
tion was unknown. A gradual recognition would be rational if there was
difficulty distinguishing permanent from transitory movements. It is
likelythatthecorrespondingmovementsin bondyieldswerenotacciden-
tal but a response that would have come gradually, as it did.!
I don'tseeanyotherexplanationfor theselong-correlatedmovements.
My eye rejects them as wholly accidental. There was no change in
government expenditures of significance during these periods. Did the
real rate ofinterest follow such a pattern? Doubtfully, since the possible
causes ofsuch a movement would not explain the gold and money-stock
movements. No otherequally attractive explanatio~to Fisher's has been
presented. The evidence is circumstantial and plausible but not, to be
sure, definitive. Regressions will not support it unless we select the
periods properly and abstract from the shorter-run movements and spe-
cial periods. But so what? The Fisher effect under the gold standard is
boundto besmall and easilylost amongstrongerdisturbances atwork, so
we must be especially on guard to avoid type-two errors.
I would turn the traditional sequence of analysis around. Do not ask
first whether the Gibson paradox was there, and then what caused it.
Instead let us assert that the Fisher effect exists, therefore the Gibson
paradox was there.
Notes
1. "Bond yields fell and rose during [the respective periods between reference cycle
averagesreportedinthetext] somewhatless: afall of1.4percentagepointsinthefirst period
(or 1.7 points allowing for the lagged upturn) and a rise of0.1 in the second period (or 1.0
point from theirtroughin 1899-1902to a prewarhigh for the 1913-18referencecycle . . . ).
Bond yields in money terms, therefore, seem to have accounted gradually and slowly for
roughly halfthe average rate ofinitial appreciation and subsequent depreciation ofmoney;
and, the longer the movement of commodity prices in one direction, the larger was the
adjustment" (Cagan 1965, p. 307).610 Daniel K. Benjamin and Levis A. Kochin
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General Discussion
KOCHIN started with a clarifying comment. He pointed out that both
authors believe that the Fisher effect exists in the United States, Brazil,
and Israel today. Nominal interest rates in Israel are different from those
in Switzerland, and the difference is connected to the difference in
inflation. But in Great Britain under the gold standard there was no
rational basis to anticipate future inflation on the basis ofpast inflation,
and thus no presumption that there should have existed a Fisher effect.
In response to Barra, who recommended that Benjamin and Kochin
use the levels ofvariables in at least some oftheir tests, Kochin cited the
workofGrangerand Newbold. Theirworkindicates thatthere is a 25- or
30-percent probability of observing a t-statistic suggesting a significant
relationship when the variables are both random walks, if the levels of
trended variables rather than first differences are used.
MCCLOSKEY urged the authors to follow Barro's suggestion regarding
causalitystatistics, buthe argued against usingthoseinLewis F. Richard-
son's 1960 book, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Pittsburgh: Boxwood
Press). He cited an even more up to date compilation by J. David Singer611 War, Prices, and Interest Rates
and Melvin Small in a book entitled The Wages ofWar, 1816-1965: A
Statistical Handbook (New York: John Wiley), published in 1972.
McCloskey also urged the authors to undertake similar exercises for
other countries and asked whether the authors' argument concerning
temporary military expenditures also applies to othertemporaryexpend-
itures. Will it apply to investment booms or to oil shocks?
BENJAMIN agreedthatit will, butemphasizedtheproblemofmeasuring
such temporary shocks in a systematic and credible way.
FREEDMAN noted the authors' argument that the price level is a Mart-
ingale. Would this argument still apply if, when war begins, the rate of
inflation accelerates suddenly, and everyone expects price levels to re-
main high and to continue to rise for awhile before coming back down to
their normal levels in peacetime? If that is the case, one has to be very
careful to take into account the existence of expected inflation during
wartime.
BENJAMIN suggested that the problem is the distinction between con-
ditional and unconditional forecasts. His initial reaction had been much
the same as Freedman's. The problem appears to be that once a war
ended, residents could be reasonably confident, unless they lived in
Germany, thattheprice level ultimatelywouldfall. However, evenin the
British case, prices do not fall right after a war; instead, inflation con-
tinues, sometimes for very brief periods, sometimes for as long as two-
and-a-half years. Thus, forecasters face two problems: When is the war
going to end; and once it ends, is the price level really going to fall?
Ultimately, it did fall in Britain, but that was not the case in many other
countries. Residents could not predict with confidence what would hap-
pen in their country of residence.
WEINTRAUB pointed outthat everyone agrees that the Fisher effect has
existed in recent years, after the demise of the gold standard. The
question is whether it existed under the gold standard? Benjamin and
Kochin conclude that it did not exist for the United Kingdom and Law-
rence Summers found it did not exist for the UnitedStates. Irving Fisher,
using less sophisticated techniques, also found it did not exist for the
United States. It is not surprising that we fail to observe a Fisher effect
under the gold standard, for prices were reasonably stable for long
periodsoftime. Undera gold standard, we shouldfail to observe a Fisher
effect since prices are not expected to change; however, that doesn't
mean the Fisher effect doesn't exist. Interest rates could have beenvastly
different had prices been expected to change.
MELTZER argued that an accurate reading of David Hume suggested
that the lag between price changes and interest rates was highly vari-
able-not constant, as Benjamin and Kochin had modeled it. Wars and
other discontinuous events would show up quickly, whereas changes in
the world money supply might show up more gradually.612 Daniel K. Benjamin and Levis A. Kochin
MCGOULDRICK suggested that international comparisons embracing
the 1850s and 1860s would strengthen the authors' case. In this earlier
period, there was not only the Civil War in the United States but the
Crimean War, two wars between Austria, Prussia, and Denmark, and
finally the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. In comparison, after 1870 there
were two decades ofpeace with no fighting except against the natives of
the Third World. This development makes the rise in interest rates
between 1896 and 1914, a period of general peace broken only by the
Russo-Japanese War, somewhat puzzling.
HARLEY expressed his disagreement with previous statements about
what a reasonable expectation for price changes under a gold standard
mught be. Reasonable expectations would have been based upon the
economics of a nonrenewable resource, namely gold. Accordingly, the
price of gold should have been expected to rise gradually over time, as
stocks of other assets were augmented more rapidly than stocks of the
exhaustible resource. Unanticipated gold discoveries would of course
modify this story in important ways.
KOCHIN drew attention to the distinction between ex post and ex ante
interest rates and prices. While ex post one can discern trends in stock
prices, surely few observers would dispute the efficiency of the stock
market. Thatis, ex antethebestpredictoroffuture stockprices is current
stock prices. Thesame propertyholds for commodityprices under a gold
standard.
ZECHER inquired whether this notion should also be true for a period
such as 1790-1815, when prices doubled? He recommended the use of
indirect evidence to answer the question. For example, if one observes
that people hadformed political parties and organizedin orderto change
the monetary system, as they did in the 1890s, this suggests they were
expecting prices to fall, as prices in fact did. The free-silver movement
provides a classic example of this phenomenon.
WEINTRAUB argued that there is considerable evidence that during the
last partofthe nineteenth century, the public was frightened ofwhat was
perceived as the downward trend of prices. There is a considerable
literature in which people describe their fears and thoughts. Similarly,
after 1896 there was much discussion of upward trends in prices. Many
observers would have bet at that time (1896-1916), early on rightly but
later on wrongly, that over periods of five, ten, or more years the price
level would have risen, as they would have bet between 1873 and 1893
that the price level would have fallen, again early on rightly but later on
wrongly.